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[T]he pressures for pethood are greater than ever
before. There is tremendous ambivalence about our
species' impact on the rest of the living world, which
translates into dominance tempered by affection.
There are, in other words, more people now who want
to be benevolent dictators. In addition, now the vast
majority of society enjoys powers and privileges
formerly held by a tiny elite, and they, too, want to
demonstrate their new godlike position in the
hierarchy of being. Thus, the human population is in
a frenzy for pets, more pets, exotic pets, and purebred
pets. Pet shops proliferate, as do the puppy-mills and
the backyard breeders.'

"For at least four decades puppy mills have been one of the
most shameful embarrassments of the dog world."2 The term "puppy
mill" is "a postwar American coinage, used to denote commercial
breeding operations that mass-produce supposedly pedigreed dogs for
sale in pet shops across the nation."3 Estimates from the Humane
Society place puppy mills as almost the exclusive suppliers of the
roughly half-million puppies sold every year at America's pet stores.4
Mostly located in Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Iowa, Oklahoma, and
Arkansas, there are an estimated 5000 puppy mills in this country.5
Against a backdrop of ethical considerations, 6 this paper will attempt
to develop the evolution of the canine by plotting the course of
domestication from its initial inception, aiding in hunting and
agriculture, to the current trends of breed manipulation motivated in
I

JIM MASON, AN UNNATURAL ORDER; UNCOVERING THE ROOTS OF OUR

DOMINATION OF NATURE AND EACH OTHER, 259 (1993).
2
LARRY SHOOK, THE PUPPY REPORT, 56 (1992).
3
4
5
6

Jack McClintock, Not Fitfor a Dog, LIFE, Sept. 1992, at 36, 38.
See SHOOK, supra note 2, at 56.
Id.
See discussion infra Part I.
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part by both consumer demand and the "show" mentality.' It is this
current trend that will springboard the topic into a discussion of
methods of breeding utilized to support the market which supplies,
through the "puppy mill," the consuming public with its coveted,
albeit unhealthy, purebred animals.' This paper will then examine the
legal methods currently being utilized in an attempt to curtail, and in
some cases eliminate, the atrocities caused by puppy mills by
addressing each one and demonstrating its ineffectiveness in
application.' Finally, I intend to make a case for animal rights as a
practical alternative to the current utilization of traditional legal
theory. 10

I. A Taste of Ethics
In an effort to better understand the existence of puppy mills,
as well as the effectiveness of methods employed to ameliorate the
problems they pose, it is necessary to have a basic comprehension of
the ethical considerations involved in pet ownership, and in specific,
purebred pethood. Pets are an American standard. In any given year
Americans spend more on pet food, in addition to veterinary care,
leashes, flea powder, and other animal accessories, than on baby
food." In 1997, 58.2 million American households owned one or
more companion animals, with the largest percentage, 31.6, owning
dogs.12 This percentage roughly translates into a population of almost

7
8

See discussion infra Parts II, III.
See discussion infra Part IV.

9

See discussion infra Part V.
See discussion infra Part VI.

10

II
(1993).
12

DANIEL COHEN, ANIMAL RIGHTS;

A

HANDBOOK FOR YOUNG ADULTs

65

Ranny Green, Survey Shows How Pets Rate, SUN HERALD ONLINE,

Dec.
(visited
8,
1998
Nov.
<http://www.sunherald.comllivingldocs/dogs 1127.htm>.

19,

1998)
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60 million domestically owned dogs, by far the largest amount of any
domesticated animal. 3
The most commonly hailed notion underlying pet ownership
is the expectation ofunconditional love and companionship. 4 Yet it
has been theorized that the conscious issues surrounding the
ownership and domestication of animals involve a somewhat
perverted notion ofhuman "stewardship."' 5 The stewardship concept
finds its roots in the notion that we, as humans, are God's stewards
and therefore have the duty to prune, trim, weed, breed, castrate and
herd.6 Alternatively stated, 'lower' forms of life require continual
godly/manly management. 7 It would, however, be sanctimonious to
think that this is the conceptual framework from which most breeders
work. More conceivable is that a breeder is simply providing the
consumer with a loyal and loving companion. It has, however, been
argued that even the simple and seemingly innocuous act of breeding
and domestication subconsciously serve as outlets for the exertion of
dominance over lesser creatures.' 8
Interwoven into this desire for physical domination are
concepts of purity exercised through the control and manipulation of
breed, blood, and species. As a means to this end, breeders, as well as
consumers, demand that the "human-made race of animal must have
no taint or corruption of genes that might have come from wild or
mixed 'stock'."' 9 Blood lines are maintained by only breeding those
dogs that have the "quality" characteristics/standards set by the
breeding establishment. 20 The similarities between this notion of

13

Id.

See generally Shook, supranote 2, at 15-25 (chapter one of Shook's book
discusses the love and companionship derived from the ownership of one of his
14

dogs).

is

18

See MASON, supra note 1, at 210-68.
See id.
MASON, supranote 1, at 217.
See MASON, supranote 1, at 210-68.

19

MASON,

16

17

20

supra note 1, at 218.
See discussion infra pp. 5-7.

PUPPY MILL

1999]

257

breed purity and the notion of ethnocentrism and eugenics, which has
plagued humans since the dawn of civilization, is uncanny.
I. From the Beginning
Some archeologists have concluded that dogs were first
domesticated approximately 10,000 to 20,000 years ago. 2 ' By
utilizing genetic information, however, scientists have recently
discovered that dogs may have been domesticated as early as 100,000
years ago.22 This latest study also ruled out as the ancestor of the dog
all other canine species except the wolf.23 It has been hypothesized
that wolves probably took up with ancient hunter-gathers and traveled
the world alongside these packs of humans.24 It has further been
theorized that domestication, as well as selective breeding, occurred
once society turned agrarian and needed their companions to herd,
guard and maybe even hunt.25
The history of man's relationship with the canid species has
evolved over time but has always maintained two essential functions,
companionship and performance.26 Selective breeding for these two
purposes was the main element in early domestication. "The human
propensity for manipulating the environment may have been impetus

21

Christine Mlot, Stalking theAncientDog,Man's Best FriendMaygo Way

Back, SCIENCE NEWS ONLINE, June 28, 1997 (visited Oct. 23, 1998)
<www.sciencenews.org/sn_arc97/6_28_97/bobl.htm>.
22
Id. (citing study done by Robert K. Wayne from the University of
California, Los Angeles).
23
Id.
24

Id.

2

Id.
See generally MARY ELIZABETH THURSTON, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE

26

CANINE RACE; OUR 15,000 YEAR LOVE AFFAIR WITH DOGS (Andrews and McMeel
1996) (general discussion of the history of dogs and their role in human society);
see also MARION SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF DOGS IN THE EARLY AMERICAS, (Yale
University Press 1997) (Marion dialogues the inception of the use of dogs in
America for hunting, hauling and herding, as well as, the role that dogs played in

both the religion and art of Native Americans).
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enough to cultivate prehistoric dogs as "tools" for hunting."" The
traditional practices used by Native Americans in breeding employed
periodic outcrossings with wolves and a simple criterion for
eliminating unsuitable animals.28 Certain tribes, like the Hidatsa,
would give away or kill puppies they did not want based on their
affinity for snapping at people or killing other dogs. 29 When maturity
was reached the dogs would be subjected to more practical criteria
such as the ability to guard flocks and flush out game, "or just a
willingness to serve as "hot blankets" on cold nights."3 Such
formalities resulted "in a loose rule of thumb by which some dogs
received preferential treatment in the form of food, shelter, or
affection." 3 ' Whatever the process utilized by early breeders when
selecting desirable traits, such as speed, strength, or companionship,
it is evident that the ultimate goal was obtaining functional utility,
with little emphasis on physical appearance.
I. Breeding and the Purebred Today

Originally, selection would have been based
on little more than toleration of man's company;
whereby those which would co-operate most readily
were selected. As time passed and the business of
keeping body and soul together did not entirely
occupy man... he began to allow himself the luxury
of selecting dogs whose appearance pleased him."32

27

28

supranote 26, at 7.
It was believed that these periodic breedings with wolves would enhance
THURSTON,

the strength and endurance of the animal while maintaining the desired amiable
traits.
29
Thurston, supranote 26, at 9.
30
Id. at 10.
31
Id.
32
FRANK JACKSON, DOG BREEDING; THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE 41
(1994).
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This trend has produced two main camps of breeding, both with
differing motivations and tactics for achieving their goal of
reproduction of the canine species. First, there are those who breed
dogs with the intention of improving and enhancing the breed, and
who are often referred to as "hobby breeders."33 At this stage it is
important to point out that the term, "hobby breeder", is relatively
broad and essentially encompasses three distinct subgroups of
breeders. Ther e are those who are motivated solely by the
perpetuation ofa healthy well tempered dog that will ultimately make
some would-be pet owner an enjoyable companion." Because my
paper does not focus on this type of breeder, any use of the term
"hobby breeder" hereinafter discussed does not include or pertain to
this subsection. The motivation of a second subgroup of hobby
breeders is not as altruistic; from time to time the activities of this
group are addressed in this paper. These breeders produce most of the
show dogs, insisting on their "right to produce dogs that catch a
judge's eye."35 Such insistence has produced dogs that while visually
pleasing, on occasion, have crippling and often fatal physical genetic
deficiencies.36 It is important to remember that while these animals
typically are show dogs, there is only so much room in the world of
show, leaving the rest to be sold to the average pet-owning consumer.
A third subgroup of hobby breeders breeds dogs for performance in

Norma Bennet Woolf, Just What is a Puppy Mill?, Dog Owners Guide;
The Online Newspaper for All Pet and Show Dog Owners (visited Oct. 23, 1998)
33

<www.canismajor.com/dog/puppymil.html>.
34
Interview with Kathy Cauly (Feb. 26, 1999).
35
Shook, supra note 2, at 50.
36
Id.at 34-45 & 67- 81 (The German Shepherd has been selectively bred for
sloped haunches which give the appearance of readiness to attack, but result in
chronic hip dysplasia.); see also Cohen, supranote 9, at 71 (Certain characteristics
of the Bulldog, like the large head, have been exaggerated so that the puppies have
to be born by cesarean section.).
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what are commonly designated as "field trials.""7 These dogs are
highly adept at performing those tasks that make up their respective
breed competitions, such as retrieval, speed, or endurance.38 While
training for competition such animals rarely have human interaction,
which on occasion results in a dog that is too high strung to make a
decent companion.39
IV. The Puppy Mill
In contrast to "hobby breeders," commercial breeders are the
focal point of this paper. It is these individuals who breed dogs
simply as a means of profit, resulting in genetically and physically
deficient animals who, often times, are malnourished and reared in
unsanitary conditions.40 It is under this last category of breeders that
puppy mills, and puppy millers, fall. "By common definition, a puppy
mill is a business whose sole product is puppies.... "41 There is,
however, a much more acute definition that brings to light the
atrocities and horrors that make up this recent American
phenomenon. It is the first hand observation of a more atrocious
puppy mill that provides the best method for visualizing and
appreciating the conditions under which breeding is conducted within
the confines of these establishments.

The grounds of the puppy mill are a mess ...
Everywhere you look, you see trash -- rusted cars, dog

37
38

39

Id.at 5 1.
Id.
Id. (Shook also notes that while these field trial dogs are competitive

within their specific competition tasks, they are often inept at performing tasks
outside the performance arena, like hunting).
40
Woolf, supranote 26, at <www.canismajor.com/dog/puppymil.html>.
41

Linda Smith, Puppy Mill Nightmare, Dog Owner's Guide; The Online

Newspaper for All Pet and Show Dog Owners (visited Oct. 23, 1998)
<www.canismajor.com/dog/pupmillv.html>.
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crates, bags of feces, mounds of feces... and empty
food and water bowls.... [K]ennels have plenty of
dogs in them, but no food and water. They are filthy
from one end to another; the concrete is covered with
excrement.... One of the barns is a place of death;
there are dead dogs here, some only skeletons, some
so badly decayed that only hair and skeletal forms
remain .... [D]ogs are emaciated.... They live in
filth .... Because of the filth, there are flies; most of
the dogs have missing pieces of ears, eaten away by
flies.... Multiple dogs in one kennel results in
continual fighting, injury, and death.... Puppies are
in kennels with several dogs. These uncles and aunts,
brother and sisters attack, maim, and sometimes kill.
... A mother dog with babies gets no special pre- or
post-natal care -- no extra food, no extra space. At this
mill a mother dog is found in a shed with a litter of
pups. The windows and doors are shut, there is no
water, and it is 98 degrees. Two of the pups are dead.
Elsewhere, other mothers are dead, leaving their pups
to their own devices for survival ....
There is no
veterinary care here; there is very little human care or
42
contact.

Id.(This isan actual account of a "kennel" visited by members of a rescue
group. The puppy mill from which the depiction isbased was eventually raided and
the dogs were given veterinary care and placed in homes.). Another poignantly
detailed description of a puppy mill can be found in Shook's book; "Dams and sires
are bred nonstop from the age of six months to five to six years of age. When
females have been bred to literal exhaustion, they are often killed. Reports from the
ASPCA describe how mother's dead bodies are sometimes fed to surviving dogs.
Puppies born at puppy mills are often shipped during infancy, four weeks of age.
Shipping methods employ tightly packed containers where suffocation is
commonplace." Shook, supra note 2, at 56-58.
42
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Initially, it was the United States government that set the stage
for the puppy mill.' After World War II, when conventional crops
failed, American farmers sought alternate means of making money.44
In response, the United States Department of Agriculture began
promoting the raising of dogs as a crop. 4 As the supply of dogs
began to grow, 46 so too did the number of retail pet stores.47 As
eventually would happen, the demand for pets skyrocketed and the
retail store became the predominant distributor ofpuppy mill animals,
as well as, one ofthe most popular methods for obtaining a pet.48 The
ASPCA estimates that approximately half a million puppies are sold
annually by pet stores.49
The end result of bad breeding and poor care is an unhealthy,
and often behaviorally erratic, animal. Due to the puppy mill
breeders' failure to select out propensity for disease, and often times
because of the purposeful selection in of hereditary traits such as the
sloped hips of the German Shepherd, puppy mill dogs are prone to
countless infirmities." Simultaneously, because these puppies have
been so badly treated during critical developmental periods they may
develop behavioral problems as adult dogs such as chronic
nervousness or aggression."' Unfortunately for the consumer, most

43

Woolf, supranote 33, at <www.canismajor.com/dog/puppymil.html>.

44

Id.

45

Id.

See SHOOK, supranote 2, at 56. There are currently an estimated 5000
puppy mills in the United States producing hundreds upon thousand of dogs a year.
47
Id.
48
See discussion infra pp. 9-12 (reasons why the retail store is so attractive
to the pet consuming public).
49
See SHOOK, supra note 2, at 56.
so
See generally SHOOK, supranote 2, at 67-81. Certain hereditary problems
are synonymous with specific breeds, such as hip dysplasia in the St. Bernard and
46

Bullmastiff and eye problems in the Retriever (curly or smooth coated).
51

See Cohen, supra note 11, at 69.
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puppies are cute, cuddly, and friendly and these undesirable
behavioral traits are not apparent until the puppy has matured into a
52
dog.
In 1997 the Humane Society of the United States estimated
that ninety percent of the animals sold in pet stores come from a
puppy mill. 3 "Gimmicks" are often used to make a sale. Why then,
in light of all the problems that pet store, a.k.a. puppy mill, animals
present, as well as the bad press that both have recently received, does
the consumer continue to frequent this establishment and purchase
these "tainted commodities?" If the puppies are in fact considered
nothing more than a product, then it can be argued that pet stores
encourage impulse buying in the same manner as many other retail
establishments. "Pet store owners/employees are all trained in the art
of selling and being friendly."55 While pet shops place cute puppies
behind a window and encourage customers to hold them,56 "[m]ost
employees/owners know little or nothing about the [dogs] they are
selling except for a short pamphlet about the breed...and even then,
"add-libbing" is an art form."57 It is this type of atmosphere that
perpetuates impulse buying, a mentality that only stands to benefit the
pet store and boost sales.
What makes pet store puppies even more attractive is that
often times the purchase price will be lower than that charged by
reputable "hobby breeders."58 Pet stores are also attractive because,

52

53

See id.
Janet Pearson, Helpless Dogs are Grist for the Puppy Mill,

TULSA

WORLD, Nov. 9, 1997, at G1. In this article Ms. Pearson points out the importance
of remembering that some pet stores, "refuse to do business with puppy mills and
provide adoption assistance for shelters and rescue organizations." Id.
54
See Karen Kato, Buying Petstore Dogs (visited Oct. 28, 1998)
<http://members. aol.com /KARENKATO/petstore.html>.
55
Id.

-

56

See id.

57

Id.

.
Dan Herbeck, Vacco Suit Accuses Store of Selling DiseasedAnimals,
BUFFALO NEWs, Sept. 23, 1998, at Al. Pet Store dogs purchased by customers of
Noah's Pets II were charged anywhere from $59 to $100. Most purebred dogs from
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given their desire to make a sale, they are unconcerned about the
prospective home that a customer will provide for their pet. A good
sign of a reputable breeder is one who is concerned for their puppy's
future and welfare. The breeder will ask questions about the
consumer, concerned over whether or not the buyer's lifestyle is
compatible with the breed's character. If unsure whether such
compatibility exists, such breeders will be reluctant to sell their dog
and may even refuse to do so. 9 It is, therefore, much more attractive
for a consumer to do business with a pet store and not be plagued by
the high price tags and possible rejection associated with a reputable
breeder.
Probably the most convincing argument concerning the
consumer's willingness to overlook the prospective problems, and
hidden atrocities, of puppy mill dogs is the stamp of approval that
most pure bred dogs at pet stores have from the American Kennel
Club (AKC)6 The AKC is the largest breed club in America. 61 The
organization sets the breeding standards on physical appearance and
registers purebred dogs in an effort to advance their health and
welfare. 2 American fascination with the purebred can be traced to
the arguments laid out in the section of this paper regarding purity of
breed.63 Seemingly, AKC registration provides proof of purity.64
This, however, is not entirely true. AKC papers are in fact no
guarantee of health or temperament or even that the puppy is a good

reputable, local breeders don't sell for any lower that $200, and are often well
above $500. While the savings are not enormous, one can envision the bargain
hungry consumer choosing a pet store over a reputable breeder for this exact
reason.
59

SHOOK,

supra note 2, at 95; see also Kato, supra note 54, at

<http:/members.aol.com/KARENKATO/petstore.html>.
60

61

See COHEN, supranote 11, at 69-70.
See SHOOK, supra note 2, at 58-89.

SHOOK, supranote 2, at 58-89. Other, smaller breed clubs do exist, such
as the Australian Shepherd Club of America.
63
See discussion suprapp. 2-3.
64
See SHOOK, supra note 2, at 58-89.
62
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representative of its breed." When asked what the association's
response would be to someone who wanted to register a, "blind, deaf,
dysplastic [canine hip displacement], three legged purebred puppy
with green fur," AKC President William F.66 Stifel stated simply,
"AKC unfortunately does not mean quality.
It has been argued that the AKC condones puppy mills
because of the large amount of money that can be made through
registering dogs.67 In 1990, the AKC grossed over $20 million, 73%
of which came from registration fees.6 8 Six years later, registrations
made the Club over $26 million.69 In 1987 estimates of puppy mill
dog AKC registration ranged anywhere from a third to a half of all
registrations.7" Whatever the reason, it is safe to assume that because
the nation's dog business revolves around purebred credentials from
the AKC, the organization could certainly flex its muscle and have an
impact on the problem. However, it would be short sighted to assume
that an abrupt change in AKC policy would completely eradicate the
inhumanity of commercial breeding, for those who heartlessly
capitalize on breeding would find a way to continue such behavior.
However, surely the AKC could "make life more miserable than they
are for irresponsible breeders, particularly puppy millers."'"
V. What Steps Have Been Taken in Response to the Puppy Mill
The legal structure that has developed, or that can be
creatively utilized, attacks the puppy mill problem from two distinct

65

See COHEN, supranote 11, at 69.

supra note 2, at 52 (quoting PARADE magazine).
See SHOOK, supranote 2, at 57. Registration can be purchased for $7 for
individual dogs and $15 for litters. Id.
Id. at 58.
68
William Ecebbarger, Scandal of America's Puppy Mills, READER'S
69
DIGEST, Feb. 1996, at 118.
SHOOK, supra note 2, at 58 (quoting from PARADE and ATLANTIC
70
66

SHOOK,

67

respectively).

71

Id. at 60 (quoting New York dog trainer Robin Kovary).
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angles. First, there are laws that attempt to eliminate, or at the very
least monitor and regulate, the source of the product. Federal
legislation embodied in the Animal Welfare Act of 1970, 72 as well as
implementing regulations,' govern the transportation, sale and
handling of certain animals. Puppy mills, however, are also subject
to state nuisance laws, 74 local zoning ordinances,75 and of course state
animal cruelty laws.76 These laws work on the expectation that by the
regulation ofthe source, the institution will either effectively reform
or collapse under the weight of costs associated with attempting to do
SO.
Second, there are laws aimed at the distributor. State animal
dealer laws regulate not only day to day operations, but provide
remedy to the consumer if it can be shown that the merchant sold a
"defective" dog.' Similarly, Courts have held that under certain
circumstances, sale of a diseased puppy could be considered breach
of express warranty either under a state uniform commercial code,78
or products liability law.79 The hope is that by holding the dealer
responsible for the quality of their product and compensating the
consumer where merchandise is "faulty," the distributor will be
forced to pay greater attention to the health of the puppy. In turn, this
heightened watchfulness can be expected to affect the choices made

72
73
74

See 7 U.S.C. § 2131.
See 9 C.F.R. § 3.1-3.12.
See M.S. Galinsky, Keeping Dogs as EnjoinableNuisance, 11 A.L.R.3d
1399 (1967).
75
See Lawrence v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Lower Gwynedd Township, 338
A.2d 779 (1975), Greuner v. Lane County, 818 P.2d 959 (1991), & County of
Calumet v. Schroeder, 1998 WL 668412 (Wis. App.).
76
See Avenson v. Zegart, 577 F. Supp. 958 (1984). But see State v. Kansas,
823 P.2d 823 (1991).
'n
See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 753 (McKinneys 1998), N.J. Admin. Code tit.
13 §§ 45A-12.2-12.3 (1998) & Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 122125-122300
(West 1998).

See Sacco v. Tate, 672 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1998). But see Nuijens v. Novy,
543 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1989).
79
See Worrell v. Sachs, 563 A.2d. 1387 (1989).
78
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by distributors when purchasing puppies for resale, ultimately
reducing the number of puppies purchased from puppy mills.
A. Regulating the Source
1. The Animal Welfare Act
The Animal Welfare Act is designed to regulate, through the
licensing of breeders, large scale commercial breeding of dogs. It was
the finding of Congress that those animals regulated under this act
were, "either in interstate or foreign commerce or substantially affect
such commerce or the free flow thereof," and that regulation of such
was, "necessary to prevent and eliminate such burdens upon such
commerce. 80 Congress further found that it was, "essential to
regulate the transportation, purchase, sale, housing, care, handling,
and treatment of animals by carriers or persons or organizations
engaged in using them for sale as pets or for any such purpose or
use, "81 in order to insure that animals, including dogs, "intended for
use as pets [were] provided humane care and treatment."8 " The
legislation requires individuals who deal in animals covered by the
Act to obtain a license from the Secretary of Agriculture. 3 Congress'
stipulates that such a license is not to be granted unless the dealer can
demonstrate compliance with regulations set by the Secretary. 4 Such
regulations are established pursuant to congressional directives
setting out minimum requirements for housing, feeding, watering,
The Department of
shelter, veterinary care, and exercise.s
Agriculture, which is empowered to monitor compliance with these
standards, is charged with making regular inspections and even
8o

7 U.S.C. § 2131.

81"
82

Id.

7 U.S.C § 2131(1) (1998). The term "dog" is defined by the Code to

include those used for, "hunting, security, or breeding." 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g).
83
7 U.S.C § 2133.
94
Id.
See 7. U.S.C. § 2143.
85
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authorized to impose fines for interference with such.86 In the event
of a suspected violation the Act provides for suspension of the
operators license and possible permanent revocation pursuant to a
hearing. Violators may also be subject to civil penalties of up to
$2500 for each violation, with every day counting separately. 8
Additionally, violators can be criminally liable for either a maximum
sentence of one year, a $2500 fine, or both.89 Appeals from final
orders of this nature are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States Court of Appeals.9"
While the Welfare Act, like much congressional legislation,
establishes some noble directives, it is the regulations implemented
by the Secretary 9' that truly affect the operation of a puppy mill.
These regulations require individuals involved in the business of
dealing in animals to obtain a permit from the government.92
Generally speaking, once permitted to operate, breeders are required
to provide animals with sanitary housing facilities free from
hazardous and unsafe conditions.93 Specifically, the regulations set
out minimum criteria for both indoor 94 and outdoor 95 housing
facilities by establishing construction standards for the housing units,
including temperature, ventilation, and lighting requirements.96
Likewise, the regulations set minimum requisites for exercising,97

36

See 7 U.S.C. § 2146-47.

87

See 7. U.S.C. § 2149(a). Such permits are granted by the Secretary of

Agriculture pursuant to 9 C.F.R. § 3.1.

8

9
90

91
92

93

94

See 7 U.S.C. §2149(b).
See 7 U.S.C. §2149(d).
See 7. U.S.C § 2149(c).

7 U.S.C. § 2143 (1998) (enabling legislation).
Animal Welfare Regulation, 9 C.F.R. § 2.1(a)(1) (1998).

9 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1998).
9 C.F.R. § 3.3 (1998).

9S

9 C.F.R. § 3.4 (1998).

96

See supranotes 84-85 and accompanying text.

97

See 9 C.F.R. § 3.8.
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grouping,"8 feeding,99 watering,' 0 and sanitation."°0 These regulations
are supplemented with requirements for veterinary care and facility
02
direction.1
Since the economic basis for a successful puppy mill is low
overhead and exploitative measures one might assume that proper
enforcement of the regulations would eliminate puppy mills by
denying breeders the ability to operate commercial facilities that are
anything but humane. Unfortunately, such is not the case. Even
though the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") has
inspectors all over the country, and was the logical choice as the
enforcement agency because of its previous expertise in livestock, the
agency has been lax in exacting compliance from commercial
breeders.'0 3 In addition, the problem endures because licensed
breeders often ignore regulatory requirements and, due to the
impracticality of accounting for every single breeder in any given
state, unlicensed breeders continue to exist."I' Operating conditions,
therefore, frequently never meet federal standards. Martha
Armstrong, of the Humane Society of the United States, has been
quoted as saying, "[o]n any given day, half the breeders would meet
05
federal standards that day, [and] half never meet the standards."
To a certain extent the regulations themselves permit some
substandard operation. Section 2.1 permits any breeder who grosses
less than five hundred dollars in animal sales, maintains three or
fewer breeding females, or sells less than twenty five dogs in a given

98

See 9 C.F.R. § 3.7 (Examples of compatible grouping are that females in

heat may not be grouped with males and cats and dogs may not be housed
together).
99
See 9 C.F.R. § 3.9.
100

101
102
103
104
105

See 9 C.F.R. § 3.10.

See 9 C.F.R. § 3.11.
See 9 C.F.R. §§ 2-3.
Pearson, supranote 53.
Id. Oklahoma alone has more than 350 licensed breeders.
Id.
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year to operate without a permit. 0 6 While it would seem unlikely that
anyone would bother with a business that grosses less than five
hundred dollars per year, it is easy to imagine a "disreputable"
breeder failing to make accurate reports of their revenue, the number
of dogs sold annually, or even the number of breeding females.
Even when a particular violation is uncovered, the penalty is
often minimal when compared to the operational profit margin of a
mill. Such penalization is therefore ineffective at truly dissuading
operators from engaging in the targeted conduct. A perfect example
comes from a case in Nebraska where a licensed kennel was charged
with forty-one violations of the Animal Welfare Act,' 7 ranging from
delivery of dogs less than eight weeks old to failure to maintain
adequate records.'0 8 Ultimately, the kennel was penalized with a
twelve thousand-dollar fine and a ninety-day suspension of license. 09
While at first glance this punishment might appear substantial, it is
important to note that at the time the case was brought the kennel's
gross annual income was over one million dollars."' It is not
difficult, therefore, to imagine the kennel paying the fine, waiting out
the ninety days, and continuing operation without sustaining and real
loss. While one could argue that these violations are not of the
grievous nature under which some mills, such as the example
illustrated above, have been found to operate,"' it is partly this type
of mentality that is responsible for the perpetuation of the industry.
This case sets damaging precedence and sends the unfavorable
message to such operators that because the victim of the inhumanity
is an animal, the bar for what is truly an abomination is set so high
that punishment for anything but the most heinous abomination

106
107

9 C.F.R. § 2.1(a)(3)(i-iv).
See Cox v. United States Dep't of Agric., 925 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1991).

See id. at 1104.
Seeid.at 1103.
II0
Id.
III
See generally Smith, supra notes 41-2 (accompanying text provides
example of more heinous methods of operation).
108
109
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results in a simple slap on the wrist.' 12 Why should the sale of dogs
too young to be separated from their mother not be so unlawful that
the punishment for such puts the operator out of business, rather than
simply be a thorn in their side? By setting the bar so high, it is the
very human principals of the aforementioned stewardship ideal," 3
which permit us to exploit animal resources for the benefit of
humans. And it is ultimately the height of the bar that prevents
effective regulation. Only when people are truly in fear of serious
adverse consequences can regulation through punishment hope to
deter conduct of this nature.
2. Private Nuisance
Generally speaking, the keeping of a dog, or many dogs for
that matter, is not considered a nuisance and is often encouraged by
society to promote companionship and well being. However, owning
a dog "may amount to an enjoinable nuisance where it interferes with
the peace, quiet, and normal enjoyment to which a person is entitled
in the use of his home, or where the keeping of dogs results in the
impairment ofthe monetary value of nearby homes either through the
undesirability of living near barking dogs or through property damage
inflicted by the animals."' ' a Often, where these aggravations have
reached extreme levels, courts have been willing to grant equitable
relief enjoining the owner from keeping the nuisance, or dog." 5
Where commercial kennels are located in residential areas, residents
have been able to obtain an injunction simply by providing evidence
that noise and odor emanated from kennel, without ever establishing

But see Toney v. Glickman, 101 F.3d 1236 (1996).
See discussion supratext pp. 2-4.
14
M.S. Galinsky, Annotation, Keeping ofDogs as EnjoinableNuisance, 11
A.L.R. 1399 (1967).
11J5
See Tichnor v. Vore, 953 S.W.2d 171, 177 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); see also
Rae v. Flynn, 690 SO. 1341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
112
113
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that such annoyances where of nuisance proportions." 6 Numerous
state courts have concluded that it is unnecessary for any persons
living in a residential area to be subjected to the noise created by a
large number of dogs and that the existence of such was sufficient
7
grounds for issuing an injunction."1
While there are multiple defenses to a nuisance action, most
courts have been reluctant to hold for the breeder/kennel and more
willing to side with the plaintiff. One such defense is that the keeping
of dogs represents a legal business and a source of income to the
defendant. I" A business, however, regardless of its legal nature, can
become a private nuisance when its activities cause bother or injury
to the person or property of at least one individual. In such a case, the
offensive use should be relocated to a place where the activities will
not cause annoyance to innocent people." 9 Some kennels have also
tried to argue that under certain circumstances the plaintiff bringing
the action moved adjacent to the alleged nuisance and that the breeder
should therefore be protected as having established its use first.12 0
However, courts have readily held that a defendant's priority of
location, or the complainant's "coming to" the nuisance, is not a
defense in an action to restrain that nuisance. 21 One of the few times
when courts have been sympathetic to the plight of the kennel is
when a particular breeder has made, or is willing to make, efforts to

116

See id.; see also Fredericktown v.Osborn, 429 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App.

1968), Davoust v. Mitchell, 257 N.E.2d 332 (1970), Hopkins v. Stepler, 461 A.2d
1327 (1983), Roche v. Romain, 51 So.2d 666 (La. App. 1951).
117
See 690 S.O.2d 1341, 1343 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
,18
See Miller v. Coleman, 97 S.E.2d 313 (1957); see also Nichols v.
Simpson, 308 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
t19
See Coleman, 97 S.E.2d at 315.

See Ensign v. Walls, 34 N.W.2d 549 (1948); see also Robertson v. Shipp,
50 So.2d 699 (La. App. 1951), Ryan v. La. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to
120

Animals, 62 So.2d 296 (La. App. 1953) (both Robertsonand Ryan deal with a dog-

training operation and a dog pound, respectively, rather than puppy mills).
12
Id.; see also 58 AM. JUR. Nuisances§ 440 (1989) (for general discussion
on defense of "coming to a nuisance").
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minimize the disturbance.' 22 Where it can be shown, however, that
likely
the nuisance has not been diminished, an injunction will most
3
efforts.1
mitigation
kennel's
be granted, regardless of the
No doubt many puppy mills can create an enjoinable
nuisance; as alluded to earlier in the paper, the sheer number of dogs,
coupled with the conditions under which they are kept, should be
sufficient to establish the nuisance factors previously described.
Initially then, one would think that nuisance law can effectively
manage puppy mills by either enjoining operations that can't afford
to reform or reforming those who can. A plaintiff in a nuisance
action, however, must not only demonstrate the prospect of
reasonable use and enjoyment, but must also establish an injury in
fact, that because of the conduct complained of he or she has been
unable to reasonably enjoy their property. Since many puppy mills
are located far away from residential areas, there are few residents
close enough to be truly affected. Thus, while on multiple occasions
injunctions have been granted to plaintiffs who did not live in
immediate vicinity of a kennel,'2 4 it is easy to imagine that a puppy
mill located in a completely uninhabited area would be immune from
125
even the most imaginative of nuisance claims.

In

SeeDeLongprev. Carroll, 50N.W.2d 132(1951) (findingthatthevirulent

effect of a kennel was offset by the owner's installation of a gas incinerator for the
discarding of refuse).
123
See Rachlin v. Drath, 132 N.W.2d 581 (1965) (finding that plaintiff
sufficiently demonstrated that despite defendant's mitigation efforts, the nuisance
had not been abated, and therefore injunction was in order).
124
See Wilms v. Hand, 226 P.2d 728 (1951) (noting that aggravation from
barking could be heard from one thousand feet away); see also Robertson v. Ship,
50 So.2d 699 (1951) (noting that complainants lived two hundred and fifty feet
from the closest dog pen).
125
See Robertson, 50 So.2d at 703-04 (deciding that while those plaintiff's
who lived within a quarter of a mile from the kennel were justified in bringing
nuisance claim, those people who lived more than one quarter of a mile had no
basis for complaint).
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3. Local Zoning Laws

The location of a puppy mill is the decisive factor in the
ability to bring a nuisance claim. Consequently, keeping dogs in one
neighborhood may be an enjoinable nuisance, while in another it may
be normal use of the land. However, what is and is not considered
"normal" use of land is often prescribed by zoning law. "A basic
purpose of zoning is to ensure an orderly physical development ofthe
city, borough, township or other community by confining particfilar
uses of property to certain defined areas."'26 A zoning ordinance,
classifying an area as residential, commercial, or even agricultural,
may or may not permit certain property to be used for the "keeping"
of dogs.'27 In order to rule that a breeder has violated a zoning
ordinance two elements must be established. First, it is necessary to
find that the ordinance does in fact prohibit the activity in question,
namely the operation of a kennel. 21 Some courts, by strictly
interpreting the language of local zoning law, have easily made such
a determination. For example, a court in Wisconsin held that, "the
absence of commercial breeding as a permitted or conditional use in
a nonexclusive agricultural district, demonstrates that the county
board meant not to allow commercial dog breeding facilities in
exclusive agricultural districts." 29 Once it has been established that
a use is prohibited, it is next necessary to ascertain whether the
defendant is in fact carrying on the prohibited activity.' Evidence
to support such a finding includes past actions, such as holding

Lawrence v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Lower Gwyness Township, 338 A.2d
779, 781 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
127
See Hume v. Bldg. Inspector of Westford, 243 N.E.2d 189 (Mass. 1969)
(finding that defendant was operating a commercial kennel in a residentially zoned
area where such was not permitted); see also Mathews v. City of Jennings, 978
S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
128
See County of Calumet v. Schroeder, 1998 W.L. 668412, *1, 587 N.W.2d
215 (Wis. 1998).
129
Schroeder, 1998 W.L. 668421 at *1.
126
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See id.
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breeder, or including dog expenses as a
oneself out as a commercial
3
business tax deduction.' 1
It is not necessary for a plaintiff to establish that a kennel is
One would think,
a nuisance in order to enforce zoning law.'
therefore, that where commercial breeding is not permitted under the
zoning law, regardless of its impact, or lack thereof, on community
members, eliminating puppy mills would simply be a matter of
demonstrating the elements. Unfortunately, the matter is not so cut
and dry. More often than not, zoning ordinances allow an individual
to apply for'a permit to conduct an activity that would otherwise be
prohibited. 33 Various Zoning boards have exercised a wide range of
discretion in deciding whether or not to grant such a permit. 34 In
making this determination a Board is required to consider the effect
of the "non-conforming" use on both residential use and enjoyment
135
of property, as well as, resultant impact upon property values.
While one might. think that any breeding kennel would negatively
impact both these factors, and that therefore any board should
consistently reject any such application, this is not always the case.
Where the applicant has already invested moneys in the operation and
would suffer economic hardship if denied permission, 136 zoning
boards have often granted, through creative interpretation of the
zoning law, 137 non-conforming use applications. Generally, zoning

131
132

Id. at *2.

See Hume, 243 N.E.2d at 191.

See Scott v. Marshall County Bd. of Zoning, 696 N.E.2d 884 (Ind. Ct.
App 1998); see also La Dirot Associates .v.Smith, 169 A.D.2d 896, 564 N.Y.S.2d
620 (1991). Both cases deal with individual applying for either a special use
exemption or a variance in an attempt to operate a kennel which, based on the
zoning ordinance, was otherwise a prohibited activity.
134
See La Dirot, 169 A.D.2d at 897.
135
See Scott, 696 N.E.2d at 887.
136
See La Dirot, 169 A.D.2d at 115.
13
See Hobert v. Marque, 486 P.2d 1140 (Was. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that
defendants were entitled to erect and maintain commercial dog kennel in one133

family suburban residential zone where the local ordinance, in permitting "kennels"

in such an area, did not provide specifically that noncommercial breeding was the
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board decisions are only overturned where there has been an abuse of
discretion.' That breeding facilities do exist in areas where they are
that courts have been
not a permitted activity is evidence of the fact
39
"expertise."1
willing to defer to zoning board
4. Animal Cruelty
It could be argued that in order for a solution to the puppy
mill problem to be effective it must address the plight of the animal
and not, as both nuisance and zoning law, the people who may or may
not have their lives inconvenienced. Accordingly, one might think
that a more effective method for eliminating puppy mills would
through animal cruelty laws. While state animals cruelty laws are all
drafted differently, most deal directly with the causing of intentional
40
pain to animals through abandonment, neglect, or mistreatment.1
Penalties for violation of such laws, which in some states can range
from a Class A' to a Class B 42 misdemeanor depending on the
severity of the crime, typically result in either imprisonment not
exceeding twelve months or fines not in excess five thousand
dollars. 4 3
In order to examine the effectiveness of animal cruelty
legislation it is necessary to highlight two very important points.
Initially, in order for authorities to be alerted to the existence of
cruelty at any given puppy mill, complaints must be made by people
only authorized activity). But see Development Assoc., Inc., v. Wake County Bd.

of Adjustment, 269 S.E.2d 700 (N.C. Ct. App 1980) (holding that the operation of
a kennel for breeding dogs did not qualify as an agricultural activity and was
therefore not a permitted exemption).
138
See Matter of Sheeley v. Levine, 147 A.D.2d 871, 872 (1989).
139
See La Dirot, 169 A.D.2d at 115.
140
See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-62-101 (Michie. 1997); see also Ala. Code §
13A-11-14 (1998), Kan. Stat. Ann. § 2104310 (1997), Ga. Code Ann. § 16-12-4
(1998).
141
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-62-101(b).
142
Ala. Code Ann. § 13A-1 1-14(b).
143
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-12-4(b).
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aware of the atrocities being committed. More often than not those in
the position of awareness are purchasing dogs from the breeders. It is
unlikely that distributors visiting puppy mills for business purposes
will then turn around and report any suspected violations for it would
be foolish to bite the hand that feeds you.'
Additionally, and probably more significant, is the fact that
these types of statutes purport to "prevent cruel treatment
though
even
or a cruel killing or injury of any animal,"' 45 ultimately the ability to
effectively enforce their sanctions is subject to the rights of the
property owner. For example, in Kansas, it is a crime to sneak onto
a puppy mill and either photograph or document activities. 46 Such
legislation obviously impedes the process ofbringing illegal activities
to the attention of the authorities. Fourth Amendment restraints on
search and seizure have also created problems to effective
enforcement. The Kansas Court of Appeals held in State v. Marsh
that even though warrantless inspection is necessary to further the
regulatory scheme, there must be some minimal sort of mechanism
which protects a defendant's right to be free of an unreasonable
search and seizure.'4 In Marsh, officials raided a puppy mill and
collected evidence not on a judicially ordered search warrant, but
rather on an emergency administrative order issued by the
Commissioner of the Animal Health Department pursuant to the state
Animal Dealers Act. 48 The Court ultimately concluded that because
neither the order nor the Act made any effort to limit the time, place,
and scope of a warrantless search, Fourth Amendment restrictions
applied, 49 and any evidence gathered under this scheme was
inadmissible at trial. 5 Some courts, however, have been willing to
hold that once the police have received a complaint concerning
144
145
146

147
148

149
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Pearson, supranote 53.
Ala. Code Ann. § 13A-1 1-14, Commentary.

See Shook, supra note 2, at 57.
See State v. Marsh, 823 P.2d 823, 827-29 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991).
See Marsh, 823 P.2d at 830.
See March, 823 P.2d at 829-30.
See Marsh, 823 P.2d at 830 -31.
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alleged acts of cruelty and the initial stages of investigation have
begun, the defendant has been effectively placed on notice and
authorities are free to come onto property during reasonable business
hours.'
Ultimately, however, such access subordinate to the
expectation of privacy by the property owner. 52 By thus protecting
"unreasonable" searches and seizure and enforcing a strong privacy
right in property use, the courts have deflated any possible emphasis
on the statutory protection ofthe animal by rendering it effective only
so long as people's rights come first.
B. Regulating the Distributor
As previously discussed, the second type of legal attack is
aimed at protecting the naive consumer, who purchases an unhealthy
animal from a pet store, from being left with no recourse.' It is this
method which confronts the disreputability of the industry by forcing
the distributor to bear the burden of market risks by imposing
responsibility for the quality of its product, the puppy.
1. Products Liability
One avenue for imposing such responsibility finds its roots in
products liability. On occasion, courts have permitted a consumer
who purchased a diseased puppy to obtain compensation under such
law. In Worrell v. Sachs, the Superior Court of Connecticut decided
that a pet fell within the definition of a product under the pertinent
state law and that the plaintiff could therefore sue if it turned out that
their animal was diseased or defective.' 54 In a similar vein, a New
York Court reasoned that, "[t]here is no reason why...a vendor who
151
152

15

See Avenson, 577 F. Supp at 958.
Id.
See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 753 (McKinney 1998); see also N.J. Admin.

Code tit. 13, § 45A-12.2-12.3 (1998).

See Worrell, 563 A.2d.at 1388-89; see also Sease v. Taylor's Pets, 700
P.2d 1054, rev. denied, 704 P.2d 514 (1985).
154

1999]

PUPPY MILL

279

places a diseased animal in the stream of commerce should be less
accountable for his actions than one who markets a defectively
manufactured product. The risk presented to human well-being is as
great and probably greater than that created by a defectively
'
manufactured product."155
It is important to understand that while
some courts have held that the purchaser of a defective animal is
covered under the umbrella ofproduct liability, other courts have held
the exact opposite." 6 In such circumstances it is possible that the
distribution of diseased animals may decrease within jurisdictions
that follow Worrell and increase in those jurisdictions that do not,
thereby subverting any attempts to limit puppy milling.
2. Contract Law
As an alternative to products liability some courts have
employed contract doctrine in an attempt to protect consumers from
purchasing a defective dog.'57 On such a theory a New York State
Appellate Court ruled in that because the puppy purchased from the
seller was ill, the buyer could recover veterinary expenses incurred.' 5
The court held that because an animal is considered a "good" within

Beyer v. Aquarium Supply Co., 94 Misc.2d 336, 337 (1977); see also
Sease, 700 P.2d at 1054 (concluding that purpose of products liability was to
provide protection to consumer injured by defective products, and that such was
also appropriate for pets).
156
See Whitmer v. Schneble, 331 N.E.2d 115 (I11. Ct. App. 1975); see also
Anderson v. Farmers Hybrid Cos., 408 N.E.2d 1194 (Ill. Ct. App. 1980). Courts
in both cases refused to hold that a live animal was a product under product
liability law. The courts reasoned that products liability requires that the product
reach the consumer without any change from its condition at the time of sale and
that the changing nature of living creatures, which constantly interact with their
environment, precluded such a finding.
157
See Sacco v. Tate, 175 N.Y.2d 618 (1998); see also Nuijens v. Novy, 543
N.Y.S.2d 887 (1989).
158
See Sacco, 175 N.Y.2d at 618.
155
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the meaning of its Uniform Commercial Code," 9 the seller had
breached both the express warranty that the animal was healthy at the
time of the sale, as well as, the implied warranty of
160
merchantability.
Once again, contract doctrine offers a means of forcing the
retailer to take responsibility for the quality of its product, concern
itself with the source of its merchandise. Still, a retailer can escape
liability under an express warranty simply by providing effective
disclaimer, and hoping, as is often the case, that the puppy will sell
itself. On the other hand, one could argue that an implied warranty
would serve to protect the consumer where the retailer purposely
neglects to expressly guarantee its product. It is important to
remember, however, that not all dogs from pet stores are unhealthy.
Ultimately, a consumer may be one of many who purchases a
seemingly "healthy" puppy mill animal and finds itself without
injury. While the particular consumer is no worse for wear, they have
effectively perpetuated the industry by buying into it. Additionally,
many dogs from pet stores suffer not from physical infirmity but
rather from behavioral disorder. One could well imagine the difficulty
in attaching an implied warranty to the behavior of a dog, a trait that
varies widely not only from dog to dog, but breed to breed.
3. State Animal Dealer Legislation
States have also attempted to attack the retailer of defective
dogs by the promulgation of what are frequently termed puppy
"lemon" laws. These laws allow purchasers to either return a sick
puppy and either get their money back or be reimbursed for
veterinary bills.' 61 Like products liability and contract law, the goal

159

Id.; see also Nuijens, 543 N.Y.2d at 890 (finding that a puppy was a

"good" as defined by the U.C.C.).

Sacco, 175 N.Y.2d 618-19; see also N.Y. Uniform Commercial Code §§
2-104(1), 2-105, 2-714.
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of these statutes is to attack puppy mills by discouraging pet shops
from acquiring sick or genetically-defective dogs from kennels. 62
While the constitutionality of such laws has been attacked on a
number of grounds, a federal district court has held that they are
within the state police power and do not function to preempt the
AWA' 63 Therefore, for the time being, such laws are not in violation
of the Commerce Clause. They are not, however, without problem.
In order to receive remedies under these "lemon laws" most states
direct the owner to return the puppy to the pet store within a specified
time period. Pennsylvania requires the consumer to have both found
the health problem and returned their puppy within ten days of
purchase. 64 Similarly, New York permits only fourteen days for the
owner to return the "defective" dog.'65 Some illnesses or diseases,
however, do not show up until the puppy has reached maturity, which
would most definitely be longer than two weeks or even a month.'66
The statutory time limitation in these laws is too short to help a
consumer with a puppy that has anything but an immediate ailment.
It may, however, be'too early to criticize the "puppy lemon
law" and pass judgment on its effectiveness. By July of 1998, the
attorney. general's office in Pennsylvania had already received
seventy-eight consumer complaints.' 67 Unfortunately, because of
budgetary constraints and staff limitations, only a small portion of
this total have been resolved or mediated) 6 8 Moreover, as long as the
shops pay the refunds or veterinary bills they are in compliance with
the law. In light of the popularity of their commodity and its high
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See Kerr v. Kimmell, 740 F. Supp. 1525, 1528-1531 (1990).
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See Heidi Russel, PuppyLaw Yet to Sinklts Teeth, LANCASTERNEW ERA,

July 19, 1998, at A l (for diseases that are congenital or heart related, however, the
time limit is thirty days).
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profits, pet stores maybe willing to absorb the costs of liability.69 and
continue dealing with puppy mills despite this legislation.
One can easily imagine puppy mill puppies comprising the
majority of dog sales from a given pet store. Unfortunately, it is
equally easy to conceive of the possibility that such animals may
never outwardly evidence any sign of their origin, such as disease or
behavioral disorder, and therefore never cause any injury to the
owner. When, however, there is a problem the right being protected
under products liability, contract law, or lemon laws is the
consumer's. The question asked by the court is not whether the
animal has been hurt, but rather whether a defective good, in the form
of a diseased animal, has been delivered, and whether such good
poses a risk of injury. Animals may be delivered to states that do not
impose products liability; animals may be sold without warranty;
diseased animals may be cheerfully accepted as returned
merchandise. Some pet stores may choose to absorb the costs
imposed by products liability, contract or lemon law statutes is a
function of the market. As long as there are consumers to purchase
these products the pet store remains relatively unaffected by
occasional imposition oflegal liability. Indeed, the possible remedies-remuneration, vet bills and the hallmark of animal dealer acts, the
replacement puppy--seem to only perpetuate the idea that the product
is nothing but a commodity. The existing law is therefore unable to
effectively manage this situation, thereby permitting the pet store
profit from sales and ultimately perpetuate the existence of the
industry.
VI. What About Animal Rights?
All the existing legal regimes designed to affect the deplorable
conditions of puppy mills permit only one conclusion; for one reason
or another these endeavors have not been successful in managing the
problem. It is uncanny how many methods attack the problem

169

See Pearson, supra note 53.

PUPPY MILL

1999]

283

piecemeal without ever really getting to the heart of the matter, the
interest of the animal. Animal welfare laws require the watchful eye
of the government, which is unable to oversee all operations and
discover all the violations. Based on simple arithmetic, it would be
virtually impossible for any one agency to maintain the consistent
supervision needed to truly dissuade puppy mills from carrying on
business as usual. In Missouri alone there are over one thousand
licensed breeders. 17 0 Pennsylvania has upwards of two thousand
kennels.' 7 ' Unfortunately, the Department of Agriculture is only
staffed with approximately 50 wardens to perform inspections.'72
At the other end of the supply chain we have chosen to attack
the problem at a point when the money to be made is very large. As
illustrated earlier, even when there is compliance, the animal's
welfare is poorly served. Products liability, contract law, and the
recent puppy lemon legislation are wholly indifferent to the fact that
the product is not a toy from the supermarket, but rather, a living
creature. When the remedy is a replacement dog, or reimbursement
for a dead one, the message about the real cruelty of the situation is
completely missed by the consumer.
A. Do Animals, Pets in Particular, Deserve Assignment
of Rights?
It has been argued that any being possessing an interest
worthy ofprotection deserves effective assignment of rights. 3 Joel
Feinberg, author of The Rights ofAnimals and Unborn Generations,
offers support for this discussion by defining such interests, or
"goods," as the possession of physiological requirements, execution
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of an environmental niche, and freedom from pain. 174 Similarly,
animal rights proponent Tom Regan, urges that those beings who are
the "subject of a life" and exhibit traits such as desire, perception, a
sense of future and psychological identity possesses those interests
75
worthy of protection.
No doubt any attempt to link this perception of interests with
animals would meet with a great deal of skepticism. Feinberg notes
that his interpretation of interests necessarily requires the rights
assignee to have beliefs before it can have an interest, and that such
a condition has the potential to exclude animals.
It has, however,
been argued that animals do in fact possess such interests and
therefore merit assignment of rights. 177 Therefore, in order to truly
subscribe to this theory it may be necessary to change one's
perception of animal comprehension and cognition. In the face of
potential opposition, such a change can no longer be dismissed as
sentimental anthropomorphism, for today "the evidence for the view
that animals have interests, that they can be injured or benefited,
comes not from the armchair speculations of so-called animal lovers,
but from scientists themselves." 78 It is, therefore, not such an
enormous stretch to argue that animal interests do exist.
Additional opposition to this theory may be that interests, as
they are commonly recognized, require the bearer to assert them
when attempting to secure recognition. For example, people generally
think of rights to free speech or religion as concepts proactively
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asserted by an individual. It would be difficult to imagine an animal
asserting any kind of right in this traditional sense. There are,
however, multiple forms of legal representation that enable assertion
'
of rights where, for one reason or another, the bearer is unable. 79
One commonly used method is the appointment of a guardian for a
Such an alternative could
severely incompetent individual. 8
arguably solve the obstacle of an animal's inability to assert its rights.
Human prejudice, however, remains a significant cause of
objection to the proposition that animals should be granted legal
rights and standing. Unfortunately, such prejudice is often reflected
in law and social policy. However, in the United States and
elsewhere, steps have been taken which give legal status to those
against whom prejudice has historically been applied. This change
has not been the result of an overnight modification in legislation. It
has come, instead, from an evolution of the' prevailing morality that
would not stand for a system that supported oppression. One
important lesson can be learned from this: that the law must be open
to criticism and direction and that "[t]he history of our legal systems
shows that [it] can be inade to be responsive to egalitarian and moral
8
consideration."' '
The current animal rights movement should simply be seen as
another step in this ongoing process. The interests of domestic
animals, especially dogs, could be more effectively served by the
assignment of rights. In such a situation the puppy miller, through his
or her failure to provide adequate means for the carrying on of life,
might be charged with some form of assault. In such circumstances
the ability of the miller to escape punishment, due to limited staffing
of enforcement authority or the enticing expectation of huge
economic gain might be significantly limited.
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By calling for a grant of rights to animals, we are required to
change our vision and awareness of them. "We are not to see them,
as Descartes did, as nature's machines; nor, as Plato did, as lawless
beasts; nor as the marketing mentality does, as commodities or
renewable resources. We are not to see them thus because each view
is symptomatic of the same, deep, slumbering falsehood---namely,
that humans are different in kind than from animals. 18 2 Rather, we
must come to see that humans are animals. "To regard the value
status of animals otherwise--to go on acting and believing as if
nonhuman animals had value only if or as they served human
interests--is to give regrettable testimony to the very prejudice here
3
being challenged."'

8

B. Specific Arguments Against the Assignment of Rights
to Animals
That animals should be assigned rights in certain
circumstances does not mean that human rights should be completely
sacrificed in return. Rather, the legitimate pet industry, breeders, and
the consuming public, as well as the animals, might be better served
if some form of rights were assigned." 4 Several counter arguments,
however, are often offered for such a position, and while many of
them have already been addressed earlier in this paper, I thought
better to organize the major ones in the forgoing section.
Initially, one might argue that animals already have rights
established by laws such as the Animal Welfare Act, and any
assignment of such would be redundant. This argument, however,
overlooks the distinction between being protected by the law and
possessing a legal right that is created or recognized by the law. As

182
183

Id. at 159.
Id.

See generallyTom Regan, The CaseforStrongAnimalRights,inANIMAL
Harnack ed., 1996) [hereinafter Reagan,
Strong Animal Rights].
194

RIGHTS; OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS (Andrew

PUPPY MILL

1999]

287

an example, the law protects valuable pieces of art against vandalism.
It does not follow that such art has rights of its own, for the law
protects the art not for its own sake but for the sake of others who
have an interest in its preservation. Similarly, much of the existing
legislation is aimed at protecting animals does not, in similar fashion
to the legal protection of artwork, establish rights. 85 Accordingly,
one can respond to the initial argument by simply maintaining that
because the Animal Welfare Act protects animals it does not
necessarily establish rights in them, therefore leaving room for such
assignment.
It might be argued that because domestic animals are already
protected, the creation of additional rights is not warranted. "86 But it
has never been the case that simply because humans - women in the
nineteenth century, children today - already benefit from the laws, we
should forego creating legal rights for them.8 7 "Thus, uncritically to
persist in treating the two cases differently merely on the grounds that
animals already are protected by (are beneficiaries of) laws, is not to
engage in the debate at hand."' 88 Such an argument fails to address
the effectiveness of the methods in place for managing the problem
by refusing to allocate more than the bare minimum. The central
question is whether protection is truly afforded by existing
legislation. The human-centered legislation, which purports to
protect, seems to do a disservice to the well-being of the animal.
"Human interests are not the measure of animal interests."'89 If we
were to have laws based on the recognition of the interests of the
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animal, 9 ' courts would be obligated to rule differently.
In addition, it might very be maintained that once rights are
assigned to animals there will be no end to the variety and number of
rights that are asserted. For example, a plant could be seen as having
an interest in not being harvested and eaten. There are, however,
relevant differences between animals, humans, and plants that make
this fear unwarranted. Every animal is not entitled to every single
right that a human being has."' No one could honestly be heard to
argue that an animal should be granted the right to vote or engage in
the vows of matrimony.9 2 In the case of the plant, a line could easily
be drawn by asserting that only those beings with conscious
awareness are deserving of rights. In the animal's case, "[t]he
operative question is whether a given animal itself can literally be
benefited, or injured; can itself literally be said to have interests...Only
in those cases where the answer to these questions is affirmative do
we have reason to raise the lid to animal rights."'193 It is my
contention that dogs should be understood as benefitting from being
free from the cruelty and disease inflicted by puppy mills and that it
is this interest that is worthy of protection through the assignment of
rights.
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VII. Conclusion
It is therefore necessary for us to examine the matter at hand,
the puppy mill and efforts to eliminate the injustices it creates, in
light of the concepts laid out by a possible animal rights solution.
Even if legislation is able to improve the standards utilized for
commercial breeding, which in turn improves the care provided to the
dogs, we are still left with the ethical problems associated with
factory type commercial breeding. 9 4 Is it morally wrong to
manipulate reproduction for the purpose of massive public demand?
Not until people, both the supplying breeder and the consuming
public, understand, or are forced to understand, the moral
implications of their actions, will the victims of puppy mills truly be
free from exploitation. Animals, specifically dogs, "are not part of the
generous accommodations supplied by a benevolent deity or ever-sothoughtful Nature. They have life, and a value, of their own. A
morality that fails to incorporate this truth is empty. A legal system
195
that excludes it is blind."'
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